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The court's role in life and 
death decisions
by Laurence Gates
The Official Solicitor considers the involvement of the courts   and, where 
appropriate, the part played by him   in cases requiring end of life or life-saving 
decisions.
This is a subject not only of some legal interest but also giving rise to some questions with a moral, ethical or religious dimension. Emotions can alsoo
be aroused. During the height of the conjoined twins case 
in 2000 (Re: A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation [2001] 2 WLR 480) one commentator likened 
the position of Mary, the weaker of the two whom I was 
representing, to being on death row. The central dilemma 
of that case was that without the intervention of the courts 
both of the conjoined twins would have died within a 
reasonably short time frame. We are all destined to die, the 
questions being how and when. This article considers the 
circumstances in which the High Court in England ando o
Wales has a part to play in that event; and also in making 
life-giving or life-saving decisions.
Each year there are about 20 cases in the Family 
Division of the High Court in England and Wales 
concerning whether medical procedures should or should 
not be carried out on people who are unable, or refuse, to 
consent to the treatment in question. There are broadly 
three types of case:
  medical opinion is that a particular course of treatment 
will save life - this includes whether a blood transfusion 
should be given, a caesarean section should beo 7
performed, or even whether a heart transplant should be 
ordered against the known views of the child patient;
  medical opinion, supported by those caring for the 
patient, is that a particular operation should be carried 
out to enhance the quality of life of the patient or to 
ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in his or 
her physical or mental health - the question of whether 
sterilisation of a patient who is unable to consent should 
be carried out falls into this category; and
  medical opinion is that consistently with the duty owed 
to the patient an aspect of treatment should be 
terminated so as to allow that patient to die peaceably  
this concerns the question of whether artificial feeding 
and hydration for a patient in a permanent vegetative 
state should be withheld or withdrawn.
In accordance with the President's Direction of 14 
December 2001 (Declaratory Proceedings concerning 
Incapacitated Adults: Medical and Welfare Decisions) a 
number of these cases, and certainly those in the third 
category, will be determined by the President. I am 
brought in to represent those patients who need a guardian 
ad litem (if 'family proceedings' under the Family 
Proceedings Rules 1991) or litigation friend (if 'civil 
proceedings' under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998) - 
primarily either children or mentally incapacitated adults - 
or I may be asked by the court to assist as an amicus (now 
re-styled by the Eord Chief Justice as 'Advocate to the 
Court').
This seminar also encompasses the issues raised by the 
recently concluded Diane Pretty case (R (Pretty) v Director 
of Public Prosecutions [2001] 3 WER 1598). Neither the 
President nor I were involved in that case and it falls 
outside the categories I have referred to above. Its special 
features for our present purposes are that it was not a case 
about medical procedures - the person who wished to 
assist the motor-neurone disease sufferer Mrs. Pretty in 
her suicide was not a medical practitioner but was her 
husband and the method by which it was proposed that he 
should act was not specified - and it concerned someone 
who was fully mentally competent to decide what to do 
within the law for herself (albeit that she was not physically 
capable of bringing her own life to an end).
One point to draw out having referred to that case is 
that the circumstances in which in judicial review 
proceedings the courts may be called upon to review 
decisions by others which may have life or death 
consequences for the person affected are many and varied. 
The cases with which I am primarily concerned are cases 
in which the courts have the original fact-finding ando o
decision-making jurisdiction. Where a party whose 
decisions or acts are in question and who may or may not 
be acting in the best interests of an incapacitated person is 
a public audiority, an interesting interface may arise 
between the judicial review and original jurisdictions. 
Munby J, who happens to be a Family Division judge and
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a judge assigned to the Administrative Court, has in A v A 
Health Authority and Ors (etc) [2002] EWHC 18 
(Fam/Admin) thrown some light upon this interface and 
when public law remedies should be sought.
I O
JURISDICTION
As a precursor to considering some of the issues, we 
should first establish the jurisdictional basis upon which 
life and death issues become the responsibility of the 
courts. It is founded in the long-recognised duty of the 
Crown as parens patriae to protect the person and 
property of its subjects and particularly those unable to 
look after them. The judges have inherendy exercised this 
power and duty, so far as children are concerned (since 
1660 either in Chancery or in the Family Division). In 
practice it has now been supplemented, and to a large 
extent superseded, by the Children Act 1989, which is a 
near-comprehensive codification of the law relation to 
children. Any proceedings concerning the welfare of a 
child can be brought under that Act and the welfare of the 
child will be the paramount consideration for the court. 
The other prime beneficiaries of the Crown's parens 
patriae power were lunatics (as then described). The 
historical evolution of that power as it relates to them is 
somewhat different.
Following the Restoration of the Monarchy in 1660, the 
Crown's parens patriae power in relation to lunatics and 
other incompetent adults was assigned by Letters Patent 
under the Great Seal (and latterly by Warrant under the 
Sign Manual) to specific individuals - namely the Lord 
Chancellor and designated Judges. At the time that the 
Mental Health Act 1959 came into force the latest Warrant 
was revoked. The 1959 Act was largely a codification of the 
law in this area and it provided a statutory framework to 
have effect with respect to the reception, care and 
treatment of mentally disordered patients, the 
management of their property and other related matters. 
The question with which the courts had subsequently to 
grapple was whether the inherent jurisdiction had survived 
in any shape or form or whether it had been replaced in 
the statutory code. This was decisively answered by the 
House of Lords in Re: F (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) 
[1990] 2 AC 1. The Family Division has inherent 
jurisdiction to make declarations as to the lawfulness of 
treatment, which is in the best interests of incompetent 
adults unable to decide for them. This principle has since 
been extended to other welfare decisions.
The two separate jurisdictions is an important point to 
draw out now. Cases concerning the compulsory detention 
and treatment for mental disorder (as widely defined) are 
to be determined under, and in accordance with, the 
Mental Health Act. That provides its own procedures, 
including circumstances in which there can be a review by 
a Mental Health Review Tribunal. They will generally only 
reach the High Court upon an application for judicial 
review. Cases concerning all other aspects of medical
treatment of a mentally incompetent adult, irrespective of 
whether he/she is a patient under the Mental Health Act, 
are determined under the inherent jurisdiction.
One example where different outcomes have been 
reached in different jurisdictions concerns the force- 
feeding of prisoners. As will be seen, consistent with 
principle established in the inherent jurisdiction, a detained 
adult prisoner of sound mind can, and must, be allowed to 
starve himself/herself to death - see Home Secretary for the 
Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam 127. However, in R v 
Collins and Ashworth Hospital Authority, ex pane Brady [2000] 
Lloyd's Law Rep Med 355, a judicial review case 
concerning the Moors' Murderer lan Brady's attempt to 
starve himself to death, the issues arising there were7 o
whether the force feeding was 'medical treatment' and was
o
'for the mental disorder from which [the applicant] is 
suffering'. In upholding Ashworth Hospital's force-feeding, 
and rejecting Mr Brady's submissions that his intention to 
starve himself to death was unrelated to his mental disorder 
and was the rational decision of a competent person, 
Maurice Kay J decided that in the judicial review 
proceedings he did not have to resolve these submissions as 
a matter of fact but that in any event on the facts as before 
the court he was against Brady on both points. This case 
pre-dates the implementation of the Human Rights Act 
1998. It has since been doubted in the Court of Appeal 
whedier the same decision would be reached today (R 
(Wilkinson) v Responsible Medical Officer, Broadmoor Hospital and 
others (CA 22 October 2001)).
That appeal raised an interesting point as to how the 
judicial review of the decision reached under the Mental 
Health Act procedures should be conducted in a way 
compatible with the patient's human rights. The appellant 
was a 69-year-old mental patient who had been detained 
at Broadmoor for 34 years. He vigorously opposed, and 
physically resisted, treatment by way of anti-psychotic 
medication. His responsible medical officer considered 
that nonetheless the treatment should be given to alleviate 
or prevent a deterioration of his condition, and that the 
risk to his health in so doing was negligible. A 'second
O O O
opinion appointed' doctor agreed and the conditions 
under the Act for the compulsory administration of the 
treatment were met. In the judicial review proceedings the 
appellant submitted a report from an independent 
consultant psychiatrist to diametrically opposite effect - 
namely, that the anti-psychotic medication would not help 
and in the light of this resistance could lead to sudden 
cardiac death. The point determined in the appeal was 
that, notwithstanding the new wider approach to judicial 
review developed in such cases as R (Alconbury) v Secretary of 
State Jor the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 
All ER 929 and R v Secretary of State Jor the Home Department, 
ex p Daly [2001] 2 WLR 1622, in order to ensure that his 
human rights were upheld the court must hear direct oral 
evidence from the doctors concerned to reach a view as a 
matter of fact on who was right.
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INCAPABLE ADULTS
Whenever the High Court is called upon to exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction in relation to an adult patient, it will 
have before it two issues. The first is whether the adult 
patient is capable or not of reaching his/her own decision 
on the treatment in question and therefore of giving a valid 
consent or refusal; die second is, if not, what is in his/her 
best interests? The issue of capacity to consent depends 
upon whether the patient fully understands die nature of 
the medical interventions proposed, their reasons, and the 
consequences of submitting or not submitting to them (see 
Re: MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426). I should 
pause to point out that the tests for capacity for different 
purposes are different. My involvement in representing a 
party in such proceedings can only arise when that party is 
incapable, by reason of mental disorder of managing and 
administering his property and affairs (see the slightly 
differently worded tests set out in Family Proceedings Rules 
1991, rule 9.1; Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 21). I 
invariably require evidence from a psychiatrist or 
psychologist who has assessed the patient and can give an 
opinion whether that test is met; and, if it is, whether in 
applying the Re MB test to the particular decision in 
question the patient lacked the capacity to consent.
The fact that a patient has been sectioned under the 
Mental Health Act and is subject to compulsory detention 
and treatment is neither determinative of his/her capacity 
to manage property and affairs nor to consent to 
treatment. The best example of this is Re C (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 concerning a patient 
at Broadmoor with chronic paranoid schizophrenia and 
with gangrene in his right foot. The medical evidence was 
that he would die imminently if the leg was not amputated 
below the knee, and he was given no higher than a 15 per
' o o F
cent chance of survival if not. He refused to consent to 
amputation but agreed to more conservative treatment. 
Thorpe J held that he had understood and arrived at a clear 
choice and his refusal was upheld. In the result, as we 
understand it, he survived and gangrene did not return.
'Best interests' has been judicially defined to encompass 
medical, emotional, and all other welfare issues. A court 
should draw up a check-list of the actual benefits and 
disadvantages and the potential gains and losses, including 
physical and psychological risks and consequences, and 
should reach a balanced conclusion as to what is right from 
a point of view of the individual who is the subject of the 
proceedings (see Re: A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549).
hospital authority that her refusal should be overridden, as 
she must thereby be suffering from a mental disorder 
because her view was contrary to the medical opinion of 
what was in her best interests. The case is also authority for 
die proposition that a competent adult can refuse treatment, 
which would save an unborn foetus. The foetus, up until die 
moment of birth, does not, in law, have any separate interest 
capable of being taken into account. This is all part of the 
right of an adult to autonomy, and a reflection that subject 
to the statutory prohibitions contained in die Abortion Act 
1967 and/or die Infant (Life Preservation) Act 1929 the law's 
protection extends only to a life in being.
This principle has, since diis lecture was first given, been 
graphically re-affirmed by die President in Ms B v An NHS 
Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). A competent 
patient's refusal to consent to life sustaining treatment (in 
this case artificial ventilation) must be respected. Doctors 
should not confuse the question of capacity widi the nature 
of die decision made by the patient, however grave the 
consequences.
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Consent or refusal by an adult may have been furnished 
in advance through an advance directive. In such a case, theO '
question will be whether the adult was capable at the time 
of giving that directive and whether it is applicable to the 
circumstances, which have now arisen. If there is reason to 
doubt the validity or applicability of the advance directive 
- for example, it may sensibly be thought not to apply to 
the particular life threatening circumstances that have 
arisen - the court will consider the advance directive as a 
part of the evidence of what is in the patient's best 
interests. One example of an advance directive is in the 
case of Re AK (2000) 58 B.M.L.R. 151. This concerned a 
nineteen and a half year old motor-neurone disease 
sufferer. Its unusual feature, so far as this disease is 
concerned, and which points to a contrast with the Pretty 
case, was that before a conclusive diagnosis of motor- 
neurone disease had been made this patient had suffered a 
respiratory arrest, and was now being kept alive by 
artificial ventilation. He had reached the stage in theo
progression of the disease that he could only communicate 
through movement of an eyelid. He told his carers by this 
means that he wished his ventilation to be stopped once he 
could no longer communicate at all. Hughes J granted a 
declaration that it was lawful to do so, it being on the 
contrary unlawful to continue the invasive treatment in the 
insertion of a tracheotomy tube without his consent.
CAPABLE ADULTS
One important principle I would emphasise is that a 
competent adult cannot be compelled to undergo life- 
saving, or any other, treatment. The clearest example of diis 
principle is St. George's Health Care Trust v S [1999] Fam 26. 
This case concerned a pregnant lady who would not consent 
to a caesarean section and the mistaken view held by die
CHILDREN
A second principle, in contrast to the first, is that a 
child can be ordered to have life-saving, or any other, 
treatment if it is in his or her welfare interests 
notwithstanding the child's or parents' views. This 
enables parental opposition to treatment to be overcome. 
Thus an adult Jehovah's Witness can refuse a blood
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transfusion for him/herself but the courts will take the 
decision if it is needed to safeguard the welfare of his/her 
child. In the case of Re: C (A child) (HIV Testing) [1999] 2 
FLR 1004 Wilson T. held that notwithstanding theJ o
opposition of both parents who believed in alternative 
medical remedies and not in the generally accepted 
current medical opinion as to the causes and diagnosis of 
aids, it was overwhelmingly in the interests of the child 
that those parents and doctors caring for her should 
know whether she had contracted the virus. He ordered 
that a blood sample should be taken from the child. 
Those of you who were at the time following the newsJ o
reports in relation to that case will be aware that the 
parents fled the country with the child before any blood 
sample could be taken and have not been seen since. I 
shall look further into the weight to be given to a parental
o o r^
refusal when I come to discuss the conjoined twins case.
The views of the child can seemingly be overridden 
however mature or otherwise competent that child may 
be. The courts have developed the doctrine of 'Gillick 
competence', so-called because it arose in the case of 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 
[1986] AC 112. That case concerned the right and ability 
of a 14 year old to seek contraceptive advice regardless of 
parental opposition. By virtue of s.8 of the Family Law 
Reform Act 1969 children of 16 and over are able to give 
consent to medical treatment as if they were adult. This 
enables a competent child over 16 years of age to override 
a refusal by his/her parents without the courts' 
intervention. But it does not follow that the refusal to give 
consent of a competent child will be determinative in the 
same way as it would be if adult. The case of Re: M (A 
child) (Medical Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097 is a 
stark example of overriding the views of a mature 
adolescent. That case concerned a fifteen and a half year 
old girl who was diagnosed with a heart disease, which 
had afflicted her quite suddenly, and which required, if 
she was to be saved, a heart transplant. Johnson J. in 
deciding to order the heart transplant was able to draw 
some support from the evidence that she was confused as 
a result of the events, which had so quickly overwhelmed 
her and the question of Gillick competence, was not 
raised. I would suggest that the Family Division Judges 
will continue to act in accordance with a child's welfare 
interests and find that it is overwhelmingly in the child's 
welfare interests to be kept alive irrespective of how 
competently (in terms of understanding and assessing the 
issues) that child wishes to embark upon or maintain a 
course of conduct to the opposite effect. There is, 
however, quite a contrast between the position at any 
time immediately prior to one's eighteenth birthday and 
thereafter. There is also a question, yet to be litigated, 
whether the protection in Art. 5 of the ECHR against 
deprivation of liberty have any application to the 
detention, which may be required in order that 
compulsory treatment can be given.
ASSISTING THE TERMINALLY ILL
I should take together my third and fourth principles, 
which concern treatment, which may hasten death. The 
first of these is that medical treatment may be 
administered to a terminally ill person to alleviate pain 
although it may hasten death, but medical treatment may 
not be given intended to bring about death. The second,
o o 7
however, is that subject to judicial authority it is 
permissible to cease to take active steps to keep a patient 
in a permanent vegetative state alive. The President (or 
nominated judge) can, and does, declare lawful the 
withholding and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
o
hydration from such patients.
Both these principles derive from Eland (Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789) as recently confirmed by 
Pretty (cited above). The Bland case arose out of the
Hillsborough football tragedy, at which the victim waso o y
crushed almost to the point of death. Whilst retaining 
brain stem activity (the point at which life ceases) he 
entered the permanent vegetative state. The House of 
Lords upheld a declaration that it would be lawful to 
withhold further life-prolonging treatment and care from 
him, namely continued artificial nutrition and hydration, 
as being in his best interests peaceably to die, whereas the 
converse of keeping him alive would have been futile. This 
principle has been held by the President to be compatible 
with the Human Right Act (NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust 
B v H [2001] 1 FCR 406. The Pretty case is authority for 
the proposition that there is no positive obligation upon a 
State under the European Convention on Human Rights to 
allow for euthanasia or assisted suicide. A number of 
questions of interest arise.
The first of these related propositions takes us into the 
doctrine of double effect. It is perfectly permissible to, say, 
administer a dose of diamorphine intending the one 
consequence (the alleviation of pain) but reasonably 
foreseeing the other (that death will be hastened). The 
Rubicon is crossed if by this intentional act the hastening 
of death is intended. It can be appreciated that there may 
be a fine dividing line between the legal concepts of 
intention and reasonable forseeability. This dividing line is 
made more difficult in that in the criminal law intention is 
more widely defined than in medical law, and would 
encompass the administration of a dose of diamorphine 
virtually certain to cause death. Yet it is clearly an 
important principle that the intentional hastening or 
causing of death by a positive act is not permissible unless 
or until Parliament decrees that it is and defines the 
circumstances in which it is to be permitted and the 
safeguards which should be applicable to it.
The second of these related propositions introduce the 
distinction between positive acts causing (and intending) 
death and the negative act of withdrawing or withholding 
treatment, which artificially prolongs life (and by doing so 
will inevitably and intentionally result in death). I have used
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my words carefully because in such a case an accurate 
analysis needs to be conducted as to both causation and 
intention. The distinction has, however, been criticised; 
both by doctors who find the distinction between 'positive' 
and 'negative' acts difficult to draw in practice, and by 
academic legal writers (see e.g. ] Keown 'Restoring moral and 
intellectual shape to the law after Bland", ( 1997) 113 LQR 481). 
Their Lordships themselves in Bland were understandably 
anxious about the intellectual robustness of the distinction 
between death brought about by an omission, on the one 
hand, and death caused by a positive act, on the other (see 
in particular remarks by Lords Mustill, Browne-Wilkinson 
and Lowry). The distinction was one of the issues, which 
caused great difficulty in the conjoined twins case (see 
below). In my view, it allows the President, or nominated 
Judge, to do justice in those cases in which prolongation of 
life is futile. I was, therefore, anxious to establish that this 
jurisdiction is entirely compatible with Art. 2. Right to Life 
(NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H). It has now been re- 
affirmed by Pretty. The withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration does not constitute 'intentional deprivation of 
life' within the meaning of Art. 2 as the death follows from 
the patient's illness or injury; and the positive obligation on 
the State to provide life-sustaining treatment is confined to 
those circumstances where, according to responsible 
medical opinion, such treatment is in the best interests of 
the patient.
There are a couple of comments I would wish to make. 
The first is based upon the requirement that the court's 
sanction is given. Doctors should not assume the
o
lawfulness, even where those close to the patient are of the 
same view that the artificial nutrition and hydration should 
be withdrawn. Other circumstances in which doctors 
consider they are acting in the best interests of their 
patients in withdrawing or withholding treatment may not 
be subject to court review. As a matter of general principle, 
the BMA argues that other situations in which life- 
prolonging treatment is not a benefit to the patient should 
not routinely be subject to review by the courts (Guidance 
Jor Decision Making on Withholding or Withdrawing Life- 
Prolonging Medical Treatment, BMJ Publishing 1999). A 
passive 'Jo not resuscitate' decision, which does not involve 
an assault, does not give rise to the same potential legal 
liability and therefore does not require the court's 
authority, although unless handled sensitively and in 
accordance with recommended practice, it may give rise to 
public concern (or form the basis for a negligence action).
1 x O O '
My second comment is that the Family Division has not yet 
been faced with a case of minimal as opposed to no 
awareness - i.e. not falling within the medically accepted 
definition of permanent vegetative state - where it may be 
possible to mount similar arguments as to futility and 
benefit. In one case the then President Sir Stephen Brown 
granted a declaration albeit that one paragraph of the Royal 
College of Physicians' Guidelines for determining the 
existence of PVS was not met but where he was satisfied
that there was no awareness (Re D (Medical 
Treatment,)[1998] 1 FLR 411). I would not wish to predict 
the arguments I would mount in a case in which the 
evidence was of some minimal awareness but not of a 
nature to change the essential balance to be struck in terms
o
of futility in maintaining treatment or best interests that the 
patient's life should not be prolonged (as may occur in a 
case in which a patient is diagnosed as being in a 'localising 
responsive state', which is regarded as a presentation of the 
vegetative state but which should now more accurately be 
described as the 'minimal conscious state').
Unfortunately, these issues from time to time arise in 
the context of what should be the other end of life, in 
relation to babies or young children. The Royal College of 
Paediatric and Child Health has issued guidelines,o T
Withdrawing or Withholding Life Saving Treatment in 
Children, a Framework Jor Practice, which refer to a 'no 
chance' situation where a child has such a severe disease 
that life sustaining treatment simply delays death without 
a significant alleviation of suffering, thereby rendering 
such treatment inappropriate. In NHS Trust v D (2000) 
5 5 BMLR 19 Cazalet J was faced with this situation in a 
severely disabled 19 month old child also suffering from 
irreversible and worsening lung disease, heart failure, and
o o ' '
hepatic and renal dysfunction. The NHS Trust sought an 
order to the effect that if the child were to suffer a 
respiratory or cardiac failure or arrest it would be lawful 
to treat him with palliative care only with a view to easing 
his suffering and permitting his life to end peacefully and 
with dignity1. On behalf of the child I supported this as 
being in his best interests. The parents were opposed. The 
Judge granted the order sought. It is not truly a case of 
futility as continuing mechanical intervention would have 
had an effect in prolonging life (a life expectancy of one 
year at most was forecast). However, in so doing it would 
increase his pain and suffering and would not therefore be 
in his best interests. The leading authority in this area is
O J
the Court of Appeal's decision in Re J (A Minor) 
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33.
THE CONJOINED TWINS
I have now reached the point when I should discuss 
aspects of that special one-off case, the conjoined twins 
(Re: A). I say it was one-off because the facts were so 
unique. The twins were extensively joined at the pelvis, 
and each had her own brain, heart and lungs and other7 o
vital organs, except for the bladder, which was common, 
and her own arms and legs. The medical evidence was that
o
Jodie sustained the life of Mary by circulating oxygenated 
blood through a common artery. Without this assistance, 
and therefore, if separated, Mary would die. If, however, 
not separated Jodie's heart would eventually fail and both 
would die within a few months of birth.
At first instance Johnson J decided the case in favour of 
ordering separation upon the basis that (a) it was in the
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welfare interests of both twins that it should take place - 
i.e. it was in Mary's best interests in the particular 
circumstances facing her that her death should be
o
hastened - and (b) the separation procedures would be the 
equivalent of the negative act of withdrawing life- 
prolonging treatment. Both these bases were questionable 
and not upheld in the Court of Appeal although the 
decision itself was affirmed. Two of the three appeal 
Judges accepted my argument that the sanctity of life 
outweighed any arguments based upon quality of life so 
that hastening death could not be in Mary's best interests. 
All three agreed that the proposed operation was a positive 
act of invasive surgery.
The ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeal is more 
difficult briefly to define, and the judges did not all say the 
same thing. For our present purposes I shall quote from 
the head note in the Family Law Reports (which being in 
the Family Law arena I prefer to the head note in the 
Weekly Law Reports):
'.... Where the Court was considering the position of two children, 
the requirement that the interests of the child be paramount was 
qualified by the need to have regard to potential detriment Jor one 
in the light of the potential benefit jor the other. The view of the 
parents commanded very great respect, but was subordinate to the 
issue of the child's welfare. Bearing in mind that the weaker twin 
had, on any view, only a Jew months to live, whereas the stronger 
twin has the prospect of a relatively normal life if the operation took 
place, the least detrimental choice, balancing the interests of these 
two children, was to permit the operation to be performed. It would 
be lawfulJor the doctors to perform the operation, even though it 
would result in the death of one of the patients, because the doctors 
would be acting in defence of the stronger twin, who was being 
killed by the weaker twin. The doctors would not be murdering the 
weaker twin, because they would be acting in quasi-self-defence, or 
with the defence of necessity'.
There are certain aspects I should draw out. First, there 
are two family law points. The first concerns the weight to 
be given to parental opposition. A strong feature of the case 
is that based upon their Roman Catholic beliefs both parents 
maintained their refusal to consent to the operation whilst 
the case was being heard at first instance and in the Court of 
Appeal. Their views were in the leading judgment, rightly, 
described as a very important part of the case. Ward L.J. 
pointed out that nonetheless the English court had 
overriding control in the welfare interests of the child; the 
court was not just a reviewer of the parents' decision in a 
judicial review sense, but itself had to decide what was right; 
and where in striking a balance between the welfare interests 
of the twins it came to one view, the court's view must 
prevail. This is a strong affirmation of the welfare principle 
being paramount, the more so as the judgment was reached 
in a context in which there was a strong body of opinion in 
favour on ethical and religious grounds of the parents' views.
In support of this approach Ward LJ cited Re T (A
Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 FLR 502.
This was a decision of the Court of Appeal, including the 
President, in which, whilst the same principles were 
adopted, a different outcome was reached. It concerned a 
one year old baby with a life threatening liver defect, and 
the unanimous medical opinion was that without a liver 
transplant he would not live beyond the age of two and 
half years. His parents refused to consent to that operation 
and their wish prevailed. In analysing that authority in Re: 
C (HIV Test) (cited above) Wilson J pointed out that the 
intervention proposed for the child was unworkable 
without the parents' consent as the burden of ensuring a 
successful aftermath was on them. There is a judgment to 
be drawn on behalf of a child whose parents are implacably 
opposed to life-saving treatment whether the solution can 
only be found in a care order, under which the local 
authority concerned could secure that the necessary 
treatment took place. The President will tell you how a 
happy resolution eventually emerged in the liver transplant 
case in that divorced from the pressure of the litigation 
parents and doctors reached agreement and a successful 
operation was undertaken.
The second family law point in the conjoined twins case 
is the very balancing of the interests of the twins. This led 
the court into eschewing (in my view rightly) any analysis 
based upon comparing quality of life, but nonetheless 
deciding that the balance was to be struck in terms of the
o
worthwhileness of the treatment as compared to no 
treatment, although whether this avoids all comparison in 
terms of quality of life is open to argument.
Secondly, there is the criminal law aspect. In order to 
reach the conclusion that the operation could, and should, 
lawfully be performed it was necessary to decide that no 
criminal act in relation to Mary would occur. It is here that 
the argument ranged over the whole field of the common 
law definition of murder since Coke's Institutes (1797), the 
necessary intention for murder (R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 
82), when and if the sacrifice of one human being for the 
benefit of another could ever be made (see R v Dudley &, 
Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273), and when the doctrines of 
necessity and/or quasi-self-defence could apply. On this 
aspect I shall content myself with the point that this 
argument revolved around the peculiar facts of this case, 
stemming from the starting point that although the one 
twin was dependent upon the other as I have described 
both were separate lives in being requiring the protection 
of the law. In the result, an English court for the first, and 
possibly only, time sanctioned a surgical procedure to a 
patient (Mary) which (i) did not confer, nor was intended 
to confer, any benefit upon her and (ii) to the knowledge 
of the doctors involved would necessarily cause her death 
in the course of the procedure or immediately thereafter. 
The alternative, not to separate or only to separate when 
both were on the point of death, would have led to the 
death of both. On top of all this and faced with this 
dilemma the Court of Appeal considered the human rights 
aspects, and hardly surprisingly found that the Convention
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rights did not provide any simpler resolution to this 
dilemma. How the grounds given for this decision fit into 
or are consistent with the general principles established in 
Bland and Pretty remains a subject for argument.
CONCLUSION
In bringing tiiese remarks to a close, I should reflect 
upon the fact that the material I have covered is largely 
judge-made law under the inherent jurisdiction or within 
the parameters laid down in the Children Act. This is 
territory in which legislators in Parliament fear to tread.
I should look forward at least to what legislative 
developments we can expect. I do not expect within the 
reasonably foreseeable future legislation on euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. Equally, I do not expect legislation at all in 
the area covered by the Bland judgment. On the other hand, 
there is clearly in the offing a reform of the Mental Health Act. 
Moreover, there has been flagged up possible legislation on 
decision-making on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults 
promoted by the Lord Chancellor, but the timing of which 
remains uncertain. This latter legislation, if it comes, is likely 
to touch upon a number of themes discussed here. In 
particular, the proposed new scheme for Continuing Powers 
of Attorney (as opposed to the current Enduring Powers of 
Attorney) will allow individuals to delegate decision-making 
in respect of healthcare and welfare issues in addition to
matters relating to their property and financial affairs. It will 
for the first time in England and Wales provide a statutory 
framework for welfare decision-making on behalf of an 
incapacitated adult (including a statutory definition of 
capacity and guidance as to best interests), and will give a 
wider jurisdiction to a regional Court of Protection over the 
person of a mentally incapacitated patient. That legislation, 
however, is likely to steer clear of the life and death issues we 
have discussed. In his Policy Statement Making Decisions 
(published in October 1999) the Lord Chancellor has 
indicated that one aspect of the Law Commission's 
recommendations in their Report ''Mental Incapacity'1 (Law 
Com. 23, published in February 1995) he will not be 
putting to Parliament is in relation to advance statements 
about healthcare.
We can, in any event, expect this to be an area in which 
the courts will continue to develop the law in accordance 
with the justice of a case in line with the principles I have 
described. @
Laurence Gates, Official Solicitor
This article is taken Jmm a lecture given by the Official Solicitor for the Society 
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THE SOCIETY FOR ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES
NOTICE OF AGM
NOTICE is hereby given that the Annual General Meeting of the Society will be held at the Institute for Advanced Legal 
Studies, Charles Clore House, 17 Russell Square, London, WC1B 5DR on Wednesday 12th June 2002 at 5.00 pm for 
the transaction of the following:
1. To receive and approve the annual report of the Executive Committee on the Society's activities.
2. To receive and approve the accounts for the year ending 3 1 May 2001.
3. To re-appoint Knox Cropper as auditors and authorise the Executive Committee to fix their remuneration.
4. To consider nominations for and to make appointments to the Executive Committee.
5. Any other business.
BY ORDER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Notes:
The annual report and accounts will be available for inspection by members on 12 June. The annual report will also be 
available on the Society website: http://ials.sas.ac.uk/SALS/society.htm
A member entitled to attend and vote at the meeting is entitled to appoint a proxy to attend and vote instead of him/her; 
a proxy need not be a member.
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